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	<title>Comments on: House Introduces Bill to Allow C-TPAT Certification for Non-Asset 3PL&#8217;s</title>
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	<link>http://www.nation2nation.net/security/c-tpat/house-introduces-bill-to-allow-c-tpat-certification-for-non-asset-3pls/</link>
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		<title>By: Peter</title>
		<link>http://www.nation2nation.net/security/c-tpat/house-introduces-bill-to-allow-c-tpat-certification-for-non-asset-3pls/#comment-3337</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Jul 2010 01:41:07 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Security of the supply chain should involve all members of the supply chain. Any site left under the radar offers a weakness to the entire chain irrespective of the security strengths of some of the participants. 
The greatest flaw in C-TPAT however is that the first level relies on a self declaration of the security compliance to the C-TPAT criteria. A bit like &quot;no officer i was not speeding&quot;. 

I applaud any supply chain security initiative that is risk based, addresses the security issues applicable to the site/organisation and applies a confirmation process that the security integrity of those organisations that choose to participate. Unfortunately C-TPAT falls short on all counts. 

Legislate all they like but until security is validated throughout the entire supply chain, from source (including international) to user, we must assume that there is an overall security weakness in the supply chain. How else do the supply chain users safeguard against theft, counterfeit introductions, smuggling and other illegal concerns to both public and private enterprise.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Security of the supply chain should involve all members of the supply chain. Any site left under the radar offers a weakness to the entire chain irrespective of the security strengths of some of the participants.<br />
The greatest flaw in C-TPAT however is that the first level relies on a self declaration of the security compliance to the C-TPAT criteria. A bit like &#8220;no officer i was not speeding&#8221;. </p>
<p>I applaud any supply chain security initiative that is risk based, addresses the security issues applicable to the site/organisation and applies a confirmation process that the security integrity of those organisations that choose to participate. Unfortunately C-TPAT falls short on all counts. </p>
<p>Legislate all they like but until security is validated throughout the entire supply chain, from source (including international) to user, we must assume that there is an overall security weakness in the supply chain. How else do the supply chain users safeguard against theft, counterfeit introductions, smuggling and other illegal concerns to both public and private enterprise.</p>
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